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Schoemaker's (2020) paper ‘How historical analysis can enrich scenario 
planning’ is a welcome addition to this journal, and could not be more 
timely. Schoemaker (2020) notes Santayana's famous statement that 
‘Those	who	cannot	remember	the	past	are	condemned	to	repeat	it’.	An	
interesting question is whether memory of a major pandemic, such as 
that we are now living through, had faded to such an extent that the 
need for a highly precautionary approach in response to them may have 
been forgotten. The most depressing aspect of COVID-19 is not the un-
certainty it now brings, but the absolute certainty of a major pandemic 
at some point, yet the seeming lack of preparedness for one. Since 
pandemics are very much a known possibility, a scenario planning that 
learns from history may have assisted in preparedness for COVID-19. 
Can we hope to – finally, this time at least – learn lessons for the future 
from this present crisis, which will one day pass into history?
Indeed, in exactly this vein, at least based on this commentator's 
reading, Schoemaker (2020) is essentially responding to Santayana's 
statement	with	the	question:	‘Are	those	who	do remember the past 
still	destined	to	repeat	 it	anyway?’.	As	researchers	concerned	with	
futures and foresight science, we are behooved through our endeav-
ors to ensure a ‘no’ response is warranted. Schoemaker (2020) notes 
Mark Twain as famously suggesting that history ‘does not repeat it-
self,	but	often	rhymes’.	As	this	 implies,	there	are	gains	to	be	made	
from a closer scrutiny of history, which can rectify the tendency to-
wards a-historicism of some popular scenario-planning approaches 
(Bradfield, Derbyshire, & Wright, 2016). Neglecting history in order 
to emphasize the potential otherness of the future is fraught with 
danger. However, the full extent of the difficulty we face when con-
sidering the future only becomes evident when we also acknowledge 
that doing the reverse, by paying too much attention to history and 
thus neglecting the otherness of the future, is equally fraught with 
danger. Judiciously balancing antecedent and novel (or more contin-
gent) causes when considering the future is a central requirement 
for a useful scenario planning. Historians have much to teach us in 
this respect.
In considering how we might achieve such a balance, it is right 
to focus on complexity and counterfactual thinking, as Schoemaker 
(2020) does. The latter teaches us the fragility and contingency of 
history – how things might have been very different if ‘micro-causes’ 
(Wilkinson, Kupers, & Mangalagiu, 2013) had combined in a slightly 
different	 way,	 such	 as	 if	 Archduke	 Franz	 Ferdinand	 had	 taken	 a	
different route on that fateful day in 1914. However, as useful as 
counterfactual thinking is in counteracting any natural tendency 
we might have as humans towards determinism and teleology, the 
question still remains as to how counterfactual thinking aids antici-
pation of the future. Complexity teaches us that the same or similar 
events shuffled in a slightly different order, or begun from even a 
slightly different starting point, can lead to very different outcomes. 
To this ‘sensitivity-to-initial-conditions’ we might add ‘sensitivi-
ty-to-intermediate-conditions’ because, saliently for scenario plan-
ning, a difference at any point in a causal chain might have given rise 
to a wholly different future. This raises an issue for counterfactual 
thinking, and the extent to which scenario planning can learn from 
what might otherwise have happened in the past. There are a myr-
iad counterfactuals in terms of what might have happened instead 
of what did, and which one would have transpired had this-or-that 
been different cannot be known. There is also path dependence 
and attractor states, as Schoemaker (2020) correctly notes. To say 
the first world war would not	have	happened	had	Archduke	Franz	
Ferdinand	taken	a	different	route	in	June	1914	is	to	fall	foul	of	a	type	
of causally isolative and deterministic reasoning associated with 
Newtonian mechanics, which seeks to understand the effect of in-
dividual causes rather than considering the whole, and which might 
therefore lead to overemphasizing a single cause determined to be 
a key trigger, rather than the messy confluence of circumstances. 
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Given the prevailing circumstances, the first world war may still have 
happened, with a different trigger, or it may not have. History's real 
value is surely in considering the mish-mash of complex causes as 
a whole, and the interactions between them, and how a particular 
contingent future emerged from the confluence of multiple factors 
at a particular point in time.
However, again, here lies another danger: ‘narrative fallacy’ 
(Derbyshire & Wright, 2014; Taleb, 2008). Historians are very good 
at creating neat and plausible sounding explanations for complex 
historical events that, at the time, were messy, incoherent, and 
highly indeterminate. Within scenario planning, making use of this 
tendency may, according to Schoemaker (2020), be a ‘price worth 
paying in order to imbue foresight with greater credibility’. Yet, if it 
simply raises the perceived likelihood or plausibility of a set of con-
sidered scenarios, at the expense of the myriad others left uncon-
sidered, will scenario planning increase or reduce susceptibility to 
blindsiding by surprise futures?
Nevertheless, the future is forged in the interplay between path 
dependence	and	path	disruption,	as	complexity	teaches	us.	As	a	re-
sult, most systems of interest to scenario planners lie on a spectrum 
between absolute determinism and absolute contingency, and few if 
any	lie	at	either	extreme	(Derbyshire,	2020).	Firstly,	this	means	that	
considering the future and planning is not a futile exercise, although 
the extent of its usefulness depends on the system in question, and 
where it lies on this spectrum. We are not destined to be corks bob-
bing in a sea of chance without recourse to any form of navigation. 
We must beware the tendency, as perhaps very evident in some 
countries' responses to COVID-19, to blame uncertainty, chance, 
and contingency for a lack of preparedness that has much more to 
do with incompetence, hubris, and sheer lack of foresight. Secondly, 
it means that scenario planning's role is to uncover the tension be-
tween path dependence and path disruption within a focal system of 
interest, and to consider what futures may emerge from it, and how.
In this endeavor, what history can provide us with is clues as to 
how complex causation works within a focal system of interest, and 
a means of considering how it may work in new ways in the future 
to bring about novelty and change. It is how causes combine to lead 
to emergence, which acts as a break on path dependence, leading to 
new futures that are both a continuation of and a break from the past 
that are our central focus as scenario planners. It is in gauging the rel-
evant importance of both continuation and change in any potential 
future that is the bread-and-butter of scenario planning, which his-
tory can help us with. However, this is complicated by the fact that 
scenario planning can also be about constructing a desirable future, 
as	evident	in	the	Mont	Fleur	example	on	which	Schoemaker	(2020)	
focuses, in which scenario planning was used to galvanize consensus 
as to the type of future it was desirable to create following apart-
heid	in	South	Africa.	Sadly,	the	Mont	Fleur	scenario	planning	exer-
cise again provides us with evidence of the nature of complexity, its 
sensitivity, and the uncertainty and indeterminism stemming from it. 
As	Schoemaker	 (2020)	correctly	 implies,	 the	South	Africa	that	has	
emerged	today	cannot	be	said	to	represent	the	‘Flight	of	the	flamin-
gos’	scenario	created	 in	the	Mont	Fleur	scenarios.	The	Mont	Fleur	
scenarios are indeed a highly egregious example of what happens 
when there is a lack of attentiveness to history in scenario planning. 
In focusing so much on creating a new future, the weight of the past 
was perhaps overlooked. Lessons could have and should have been 
learned from the failures made in many similar societal transitions. 
Alas,	 as	 on	 so	 many	 occasions	 throughout	 history,	 these	 lessons	
of the past not only went unheeded, but weren't even considered. 
Beware of scenario planning that neglects history!
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